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In Poland, rural households are encouraged to diversify their activities both in and outside the 
agricultural sector in order to stabilize and improve their income. However, relatively few 
households appear to do this. This paper addresses this issue, investigating the returns from 
the income strategies of rural households using propensity score matching methods and 
extensive data sets for 1998–2008. The results suggest that returns from combining farm and 
off-farm activities are lower than returns from specialization, namely, concentrating on either 
farming or off-farm activities. The income difference between farmers and those who 
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1.  Introduction 
Rural areas in Poland face significant challenges. The average per capita income of rural households 
is close to 80 percent of the average income in urban areas (CSO, 2007), whereas the service sector is 
less developed. The dependence on agriculture is one of the highest in the European Union (EU). 
Most remote areas are being depopulated due to a lack of economic and social opportunities and 
this  unfavourable  demographic  situation  is  likely  to  limit  their  growth  opportunities  and 
sustainability.  
In response, one of the main objectives of Polish rural development policy is to improve the quality 
of life in rural areas by encouraging diversification of the rural economy. It is believed that promoting 
diversification of economic activities in rural areas may indirectly contribute to a decrease in hidden 
unemployment,  reduce  fragmentation  of  land  holdings,  stimulate  modernisation,  and  improve 
competitiveness and commercialisation (RDP, 2010). Thus, advocacy of diversification often rests on 
two premises. First, it is likely to improve the efficiency of resource allocation. Second, it should help 
to reduce poverty.
1 For transition countries, diversification also has been advocated because farms in 
these countries have been expected to achieve a post -EU-accession increase in productivity with a 
net decline in agricultural employment (Chaplin et al., 2004). In this context, diversification has been 
promoted as a measure  for absorbing some surplus farm labour.  The policy measures aimed at 
achieving this include  support for  diversification into non-agricultural activities, support for the 
creation and development of micro-enterprises, provision of basic services for the economy and rural 
population,  and  support  for  village  renewal  and  development.  These  measures  have  been 
implemented both during the pre-accession period as well as after Poland joined the EU , and have 
been embraced by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP; see, for example, SAPARD, 2007;  RDP, 
2010).  
While support for income diversification in rural areas has gained remarkable popularity, especially in 
political circles, these programmes have been only moderately successful (Wilkin, 2003; Błąd, 2006). 
For  example,  in  2002–2006,  the  income  diversification  measures  implemented  within  the  pre-
accession SAPARD programme and the post-accession SPO programme provided funds for roughly 
5,600  applicants  (SAPARD,  2007;  SPO,  2008).
2  For comparison,  it was expected that  the two 
programmes would have 13,000 beneficiaries.
3 Although this relatively low participation rate (42 
percent) was mainly explained by problems with administrative implementation (SAPARD, 2007; SPO, 
2008), there is also evidence that some households are resistant to diversification strategies due to a 
preference for agriculture (Chaplin et al., 2004).  
Moreover, the benefits of programmes encouraging farms to undertake non -agricultural activities 
are often questioned. Some experts argue that rural inhabitants are rational  profit-maximisers and 
nudging them to diversify outside agriculture w ill distort rural and agricultural markets away from 
their optimal levels.  Furthermore, it may lead to  the  overdependence of rural inhabitants on 
governmental support. Finally, according to official statistics, beginning in 2005, farmers’ incomes 
                                                           
1 See Reardon et al. (2000) and Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2001) for background discussion.  
2 SAPARD: Special pre-accession assistance to agriculture and rural development implem ented in Poland in 2002 –2004. 
SPO:  Sectoral  operational  programme,  Restructuring  and  Modernisation  of  the  Food  Sector  and  Rural  Development, 
implemented in Poland in 2004–2006. 
3 It should also be noted that the estimated number of farms that should withdr aw from farming, because they are not fit 
to survive for economic reasons, far exceeds one million (Kolarska-Bobioska et al., 2001; Ziętara, 2001).The farm structure 
in Poland is extremely fragmented. In 2007, 2 million farms were in the 0–6 ESU band. A European Size Unit (ESU) is a 
measure of the economic size of a farm business. For each farm enterprise, a standard gross margin is estimated based on 
the area or heads of livestock and a regional coefficient. The sum of these standard gross margins in a farm represents its 
economic  size  expressed  in  ESU.  One  ESU  is  equal  to  1,200  Euros.  For  more  information,  see 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rica.    2 
were consistently above the average observed in rural areas (Table 1). This calls into question the 
legitimacy  of  encouraging  farmers  to  look  for  income  outside  agriculture  from  the  profit-
maximisation perspective.  
Given that Poland’s rural areas contain more than 38 percent of the country’s population, it seems 
important  to  gain  a  better  understanding  of  the  returns  from  various  income  strategies  and  to 
empirically evaluate these two contrasting views. Interestingly, although some work has investigated 
barriers to diversification in rural Poland (see, for example, Wilkin, 2003; Chaplin et al., 2004; Chaplin 
et al., 2005), there have been few attempts to compare returns from the income strategies of rural 
households. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap and provides a comparison of the returns from 
various income strategies that were adopted by Polish rural households during the transition. More 
specifically, the paper examines which of the five basic income strategies—relying solely on farm 
income, combining farm and off-farm employment (that is, relying on diversified income), relying 
solely on off-farm income, self-employment, and living off pensions and state allowances (in other 
words, relying on unearned income)—may have been the most profitable during the last decade. 
Such  information  is  needed  to  evaluate  the  rationale  of  governmental  programmes  aimed  at 
stimulating  farmers  to  diversify  outside  agriculture  and  should  help  to  explain  the  labour 
adjustments in rural areas that were observed in Poland during the transition period (Dries and 
Swinnen,  2002;  Swinnen  et  al.,  2005).  Finally,  by  highlighting  the  most  profitable  rural  income 
sources, we aim to contribute to the ongoing discussion about the design of new rural development 
policy, both in Poland and at the broader EU level.  
To  reach  this  goal,  we  use  Household  Budget  Surveys  (HBS)  conducted  by  the  Polish  Central 
Statistical Office (CSO), covering the period between 1998 and 2008. Taking into account that Poland 
joined the EU in May 2004, we not only cover an important part of the transition process, but also 
the pre- and the post-accession period. Thus, the time coverage of our data allows us to highlight the 
impact of the introduction of CAP on rural/agricultural incomes. Importantly, we evaluate not only 
the impact of CAP on farm incomes alone, but also the relative positions of farmers toward other 
income-earning  opportunities  in  rural  areas.  To  address  concerns  about  differences  in  the 
background  characteristics  of  rural  households  undertaking  different  income  strategies,  we  use 
propensity score matching methods. These methods allow us to balance these characteristics before 
comparing outcomes. In other words, our estimates take into account differences in rural households 
in terms of their composition and physical and human capital, and compare income after adjusting 
for these differences. To our knowledge, this is the first study concerned with rural areas in Central 
and  Eastern  Europe  that  uses  such  an  approach  to  balance  background  characteristics  before 
comparing incomes. As in most cases, these background characteristics are not amenable to policy 
decisions,  but  they  should  be  taken  into  account  when  assessing  how  policies  could  affect  the 
choices of rural households. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents some background discussion of the relevant 
literature;  Section  3  describes  methodology;  Section  4  discusses  data;  Section  5  presents  the 
obtained results on returns from various income strategies; and Section 6 summarizes our findings 
and conclusions.  
 
2.  Literature review 
The  economic  literature  addresses  a  wide  range  of  questions  concerned  with  the  decisions 
underlying the income strategies of rural households. Four topics in the literature are of particular 
importance  to  this  study.  As  already  noted,  the  diversification  of  rural  economies  toward  non-
agricultural  income  sources  is  often  suggested  to help  alleviate  rural  poverty  in  developing  and 
transition  countries.  The  first  research  thread  that  is  relevant  to  our  work  focuses  on  whether 
increasing  rural  non-farm  employment  acts  as  a  catalyst  for  a  broader  and  inclusive  pattern  of 
development  (see,  for  instance,  Lanjouw  and  Lanjouw,  2001;  Reardon  et  al.,  2001).  To  our   3 
knowledge, no study has addressed these issues for transition countries. Thus, we briefly review here 
the evidence from developing countries. Reardon (1997) and Rozelle et al. (1990) found a strong 
positive relationship between the share of non-farm income and the total wealth levels of African 
countries and China. Latin American countries and India provide evidence for a U-shaped relationship 
in which obtaining the highest share of non-agricultural employment is a common facet of both the 
poorest  and  wealthiest  households  (Reardon,  2000;  Hazell  and  Haggblade,  1990).  However, 
Deininger  and  Olinto  (2001)  found  a  strong  positive  association  between  total  income  and 
‘specialization’—that is, relying on one main income source (either on- or off-farm income) —in the 
case of Colombia.  
The second relevant research thread focuses on examining factors that stimulate or discourage off-
farm activities. The existing studies provide evidence that both endogenous and exogenous factors 
are relevant to the diversification decision. Research identifying these factors in transition countries 
produces mixed conclusions. For Poland, the level of diversification was negatively related to the 
level of unearned income, the degree of specialisation within agriculture, and remote localisation 
(Chaplin et al., 2004). However, the propensity to diversify was positively influenced by the level of 
education and the frequency of public transport. This finding corroborates the assertion by Dries and 
Swinnen (2002) that the reallocation of rural labour in Poland was limited by low human agricultural 
labour  capital,  which  constrained  intersectoral  mobility.  Although  it  is  interesting,  much  of  this 
literature is based on binomial models and thus neglects the heterogeneity of occupational choices. 
In consequence, the results obtained from these models are likely to disregard important differences 
between off-farm income strategies and their outcomes.  
This line of reasoning is related to the third research focus, which examines the off-farm labour 
supplied  by  farmers  (for  instance,  Huffman,  1980;  Tokle  and  Huffman,  1991;  Kimhi,  2000).  The 
existing evidence links a household’s choice of its income strategy with two broad sets of factors; the 
first includes personal characteristics and household attributes and the second refers to external 
factors  that  are  most  often  reflected  by  regional  characteristics.  Much  of  the  existing  evidence 
concerns either developed or developing countries. In contrast, the evidence on transition countries 
is very scarce.  Among the limited number of examples are Goodwin and Holt (2002)  examining 
Bulgaria and Juvancic and Erjavec (2005) studying Slovenia. In general, however, the results from all 
these studies are quite unanimous. Ample empirical evidence indicates that decisions about labour 
allocation highly depend on the human capital endowment of a household (see, for example, Lass et 
al., 1991). More specifically, off-farm work first increases and later decreases as the age of the head 
of a household increases, and is also closely related to the level of education of household members 
(Benjamin, 1994).
4 Further, patterns of labour allocation are highly dependent on  the number of 
household members of working and non-working age (Ahituv and Kimhi, 2006; Kimhi, 1996).
5 The 
specific demographic composition of the household (paying special attention to the number of young 
and elderly dependents) is crucial because of the differential income effects  that result  from the 
budget constraints of the entire household and the costs imposed by different household members 
(Kimhi, 2004; Phimister et al., 2004).
6 The impact of access to unearned income sources should also 
                                                           
4 Important to mention are findings provided by Ahituv and Kimhi (2006) and Jolliffe (2004) suggesting that schooling 
contributes to higher productivity in off-farm employment rather than in farm work. In addition, Deininger and Olinto 
(2001) found that more-educated households are more likely to adopt specialised income-generation strategies. 
5 It could also be noted that a larger family workforce might equip the household with higher social capital. The latter point 
is of particular importance from the point of view of overcoming constraints on information acquisition and transmission. It 
should be noted, however, that the relationship between income level and social capital is not certain. The positive impact 
of social capital on household performance and/or household income was stressed, among others, by Dwyer and Findeis 
(2008), Narayan and Pritchett (1999), and Grootaert (1998). However, Knack and Keefer (1997)  and the citations therein 
provide examples in which the investigated relationship was negative. 
6 Substitutability or complementarity between the farm labour inputs of different household members should also be taken 
into account here. For instance, Kimhi (1996) indicates the importance of the time costs imposed on the household by small   4 
be recognised here, because this income is likely to decrease the need for additional income-earning 
activities, either on or off-farm, by affecting the level of the reservation wage. 
The fourth relevant thread in the literature investigates adjustments in agricultural labour during 
transition. It has been argued that central planning systems left huge agricultural surpluses in their 
wake (Brada, 1989; Jackman, 1994). Therefore, it has been predicted that market-oriented economic 
reforms such as price liberalisation and cuts in subsidies should lead to the outflow of labour from 
agriculture and thus be a natural factor encouraging income diversification in rural areas. However, it 
has been emphasised that agriculture has played a buffer role during transition by absorbing the 
excess labour from other sectors and providing food and social security (Seeth et al., 1998; Lerman et 
al.,  2004;  Macours  and  Swinnen,  2005).  The  empirical  evidence  is  inconclusive  and  shows  a 
substantial heterogeneity in labour adjustment patterns across transition countries (Swinnen et al., 
2005). In Poland, remarkable regional differentiation could be observed. Dries and Swinnen (2002) 
show  that  in  the  1990s,  agricultural  labour  increased  in  the  southern  and  eastern  parts  of  the 
country, whereas it significantly declined in the northern and western areas. This seems to suggest 
that small family farms (which prevailed in the former regions) played a buffer role, whereas large-
scale  farms  (formerly  state  owned  and  mainly  present  in  the  northern  and  western  regions  of 
Poland)  laid  off  agricultural  workers  during  the  transition.  Although  this  literature  provides  an 
interesting picture of the agricultural labour adjustment pattern, it lacks a micro-foundation and thus 
is  not  conducive  to  the  study  of  individual  incomes  and  the  decisions  underlying  these  income 
strategies.  
In summary, the existing literature shows that diversifying outside agriculture does not necessarily 
lead to an increase in income. Several patterns characterising this relationship have been identified, 
and our goal is to document  returns from various activities in rural Poland to  determine which 
patterns are found there. In contrast to many existing studies, we not only distinguish between farm 
and off-farm income but also control for different off-farm strategies. 
 
3.  Methodology 
Our aim is to quantify the average impact of a given income strategy on rural household income. The 
decision  to  follow  an  income  strategy  is  possibly  non-random.  Rather,  one  should  assume  that 
household characteristics determine the selection of a given strategy. Thus, unadjusted differences in 
average  income  across  various  groups  will  produce  a  biased  estimate  of  the  returns  to  income 
strategies. To make meaningful comparisons, characteristics should be balanced across the groups in 
which  financial  returns  are  compared  (see,  for  example,  Lee,  2005).  Building  on  the 
microeconometric evaluation literature, we estimate income differentials across rural households 
using the propensity score matching method, which adjusts for observable differences in household 
characteristics and endowments (see, for instance, Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2008).  
This method is widely used in empirical economics and other social sciences. The basic idea is to 
mimic a randomised experiment. In our context, receiving the ‘treatment’ is equal to pursuing a 
given income strategy. We distinguish between five different income strategies: relying solely on 
farming;  combining  off-  and  on-farm  activities  (diversification);  relying  solely  on  off-farm 
employment;  relying  on  self-employment;  and  relying  on  unearned  income (pensions  and  social 
allowances).  The  treatment  group  may,  for  example,  consist  of  households  that  rely  solely  on 
farming. In this case, a counterfactual control group would consist of otherwise similar households 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
children. However, having elderly dependents in the household may increase adults’ labour mobility. Further, Kimhi (2004) 
finds that the off-farm participation of adults decreases as the number of older children rises.    5 
that pursue one of the remaining four income strategies, for example, a combination of farm and off-
farm income.
7  
More formally, we are interested in estimating E(Y1i – Y0i|Xi,Ti = 1), where Y1i is a potential outcome 
measure of household i that adopts a given income strategy; Y0i is the counterfactual performance of 
a household with different income strategy; Xi is a set of observable covariates; and Ti is an indicator 
for a given income strategy. This is the ‘average treatment on the treated’ (ATT), which measures the 
effect of a given income strategy on the income levels of the treated households compared to the 
outcomes that would have resulted had the income strategy not been adopted (in other words, if the 
households  had  relied  on  a  different  strategy).  The  ATT  can  be  further  decomposed  to  ATT  = 
E(Y1i|Xi,Ti = 1) - E(Y0i|Xi,Ti = 1). The fundamental problem is that, in contrast to the first term, the 
second term on the right side is not observed. Therefore, we need to construct a counterfactual. The 
solution proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) is based on the assumption that, conditional on 
the vector Xi, the expected income in the absence of the pursued strategy is the same for treated and 
untreated households. This is the so-called conditional independence assumption, which states that 
the set of observables contains all of the information about the potential outcome (in our case, 
income) in the absence of treatment. In other words, the selection of a treatment is not dependent 
on  unobserved  covariates.  Hence,  after adjusting  for  observable characteristics,  E(Y0i|Xi,Ti  =  1) = 
E(Y0i|Xi,Ti = 0). Accordingly, in the treated households we can replace unobserved incomes with the 
observed incomes of those control households that have a similar covariate Xi. To reduce the large 
dimension of Xi, we follow Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983): instead of conditioning on Xi we condition 
on p(Xi), the propensity score, which is the estimated probability of being treated. Here we take 
advantage of the second assumption accompanying the matching procedure (the so-called common-
support assumption) and assume that the propensity score is bounded away from 0 and 1, assuring 
that each treated observation would have its counterpart among the untreated. 
It should be noted that this procedure assumes that, after conditioning on observable characteristics, 
there are no systematic differences between the households pursuing different income strategies. 
However, as noted by Heckman et al. (1997), this might not be true, and the treated and untreated 
groups  may  differ  in  unobserved  covariates.  A  potential  solution  is  a  difference-in-difference 
matching  estimator.  In  our  case,  however,  this  strategy  is  not  feasible  because  longitudinal 
information on households is not available in the data. Nevertheless, our set of covariates includes 
characteristics  that  are  crucial  for  determining  income  strategies  (see  Section  2).  Therefore,  we 
assume that by balancing these characteristics across income groups, we control for selection in the 
majority of cases.  
Our applied empirical strategy consists of two steps. First, using a probit regression, we calculate the 
propensity score. Second, we use these propensity scores to find good matches for treated subjects 
in the pool of untreated. From several different matching algorithms used in applied research, we 
employ  two  that  are  commonly  used  by  economists,  namely,  nearest  neighbour  one-to-one 
matching and local linear regression matching (Heckman et al., 1997). Comparing results from both 
methods serves as a robustness check. To improve matching quality, we use a caliper with a rather 
restrictive value of 0.005. This means that observations that differ in propensity score by more than 
0.005 are not considered in matching. 
To  assure the  representativeness of our  calculations,  we  adjust  differences  in  incomes  between 
treated  and  untreated  using  household  probability  survey  weights.  Thus,  the  results  are 
representative  to  the  population  of  households.  We  obtain  standard  errors  through  a  clustered 
                                                           
7 When comparing the outcomes of two groups in cross-sectional data, one can flexibly define ‘treated’ and ‘untreated’. 
However, in practice, propensity score matching works better if the treated group is smaller than the control group. In this 
case, a search for good matches in the larger pool of subjects is easier and increases the matching quality, as more options 
are available. Accordingly, in the reported comparisons, we always refer to treated and controls to denote strategies 
adopted by fewer and more households respectively. We perform matching in the opposite direction as a robustness check.    6 
bootstrap with primary sampling units re-sampled for each bootstrap sample.
8 Finally, to control for 
potential outliers in income data, we estimate average income differences using the trimmed mean 
of outcomes in the treated and the control groups, excluding 1  percent of extreme observations in 
each income group.
9 Trimming provides more robust and more precise results; in general, the results 
hold for calculations based on whole samples. 
 
4.  Data 
Our analysis uses data from HBS conducted annually by the CSO in Poland. This extensive survey 
includes information on household characteristics as well as details of their income, expenditures, 
and assets. The HBS is a cross-sectional sample with ca. 32,000 households interviewed each year. 
For the purposes of our study, only rural households are taken into account, leaving slightly more 
than 10,000 observations for each year. The time span of the analysis ranges from 1998 to 2008 and 
is dictated by the availability, coherency, and comparability of the data.
10  
As noted earlier, throughout our analysis we distinguish between  five different income strategies 
(farming,  combing  far m  and  off -farm  activities,  off-farm  employment,  self -employment,  and 
unearned income/pensions or social allowances). This classification is similar to the one used by the 
CSO that is based on the household’s main source of income (CSO, 1999). However, since 2005, the 
CSO  no  longer  distinguishes  those  who  ‘combine  farm  and  off-farm  income’  (that  is,  diversified 
households).  Therefore,  the  data  for  2005–2008  are  rearranged  to  include  all  relevant  income 
categories  and  to  be  comparable  to  the  1998–2004  data.  To  do  so,  we  use  information  about 
household income sources. Households are classified based on their declared sources of income; 
households  are  classified as  diversified  if  off-farm employment  is  the most important  source of 
income and the farm-income contribution is at least 5 percent.
11 For the period from 1998 to 2004, 
the correlation between our reconstructed classification and that used by  CSO  is more than  95 
percent. Thus, our classification reproduces the original classification prior to 2004 fairly well and we 
believe that it provides consistent categories over the entire period that is analysed, that is, 1998–
2008.  
Tables 2 and 3 provide basic statistics. Table 2 reports the distribution of households according to 
their main source of income. Table 3 reports the average equivalent income per person for different 
household  types.  All  statistics  are  presented  separately  for  each  year  of  the  analysed  period. 
Household equivalent income is determined by dividing the total revenues by the weighted number 
of household members according to the OECD scale.  
As  mentioned  earlier,  a  crucial  choice  for  any  application  of  propensity  score  matching  is  the 
selection of an appropriate set of covariates for which the distributions among compared groups 
must be balanced. We carefully establish our set of covariates in accordance with the theoretical and 
empirical findings discussed in Section 2. Because our goal is to analyse returns from farming and 
                                                           
8 As noted by Abadie and Imbens (2008), in the case of the nearest-neighbour estimator, the bootstrapping does not 
necessarily  deliver  consistent  estimates.  Bootstrap,  however,  provides  a  valid  inference  for  all  asymptotically  linear 
estimators, including the local linear regression estimator. Therefore, again, the results based on the local linear regression 
estimator provide a useful robustness check for the results based on nearest-neighbour matching.  
9  Koenker and Basset (1978) argue  that  trimming is greatly  superior in case of  non -Gaussian distribution. Inc ome 
distributions are usually highly skewed with numerous outliers affecting statistics like mean (see also Koenker and Portnoy 
(1987) for additional discussion). 
10 Individual level data concerning earlier periods are not comparable due to a different sampling scheme. The more recent 
surveys are also designed differently in accordance with the EUROSTAT methodology. The methodology and the main 
results of the HBS are described in the annual publications of the CSO. More details on the methodology can be found in 
CSO (1999). 
11 We have tested several thresholds for farming income; the 5-percent threshold makes our classification of households as 
close as possible to the original CSO data from 1998–2004.    7 
from off-farm activities, we are particularly interested in characteristics that are shared by all rural 
households. Therefore, we focus on the following issues: household human capital endowments, 
household demographic composition, and regional specificities. To capture differences in human 
capital,  we  include  four  dummy  variables  describing  the  education  level  of  the  head  of  the 
household: secondary general education, secondary vocational education, vocational education, and 
lower levels of education (lower secondary, primary, or none). Those with higher education serve as 
a baseline category. Because the decision about income strategy might be strongly related to age and 
gender, we condition on the household head’s age and a dummy variable that is equal to one (for 
males) or zero (for females). Moreover, because the literature shows that income strategy depends 
on household composition, we include three count variables that measure the number of persons 
under the age of 16, the number of persons who are older than 16 but younger than 65 years old, 
and the number of persons who are 65 years or older. These variables also control for the total 
number of individuals in a household. Finally, to capture potential regional differences, we include a 
set of dummies denoting each of the 16 Polish regions (NUTS 2).  
 
5.  Results 
 
5.1 Diagnostics 
Before  reporting  our  main  results—namely,  the  actual  estimates  of  the  returns  from  different 
income  strategies—we  begin  by  showing  some  diagnostics.  Table  4  provides  an  example  of  a 
propensity score model that predicts the probability difference between an income strategy that 
solely relies on farming and a strategy that relies exclusively on off-farm employment.
12 Clearly, 
explanatory variables included in probit regressions are good predictors of in come strategy choices. 
The probability of relying solely on farm income is positively related to older age, lower human 
capital, and a higher number of people of unproductive age. Given that these variables are also likely 
to affect household income, this  result is consistent with non-random selection and motivates our 
empirical strategy.  
As a second step, we check whether the estimated propensity score is a balancing function. Table 12 
in  the  Annex  provides  evidence  related  to  how  well  our  matching  approa ch  balances  the 
distributions of household characteristics across treated and controlled groups.
13 As the Table shows, 
without matching,  the null hypothesis of equal means is rejected for almost all  of the  cases 
considered. After matching, differences in means are reduced in most cases and remain significant in 
only  a  few  cases.  This  indicates  that  our  matching  strategy  successfully  balances  important 
household characteristics across comparison groups . It is a useful tool  for identifying comparable 
observations, thus allowing us to design appropriate control groups so that each treated household 
can be matched with a similar ‘control’.  
 
                                                           
12 For brevity, only probit regressions for a comparison between farm and off-farm employment are presented. Household 
characteristics included in these regressions were also strong predictors for other comparisons. Additional results for other 
comparisons are available upon request.  
13 Again, due to the large number of possible comparisons (for subsequent years and subsequent income strategies) , only 
the test results for a sample of comparisons are presented. Additional results may be obtained upon request.    8 
5.2 Main results 
We now turn to our main contribution and report our estimates of the effect choosing a given 
income strategy has on treated households. Table 5 presents the earnings premium of households 
that rely on farming in comparison to the other four types of rural households. The estimates of the 
earning differentials obtained from local linear matching are depicted in Figure 1.
14  
 
Figure 1. Earning premium of rural households relying solely on farming, compared to other income 
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Clearly,  over  the  entire  analysed  period,  farming  was  more  beneficial   than  relying  on  unearned 
income  (pensions  and  social  allowances)  or  combining  farm  income  with   off-farm  employment  
(diversification  strategy) . In  addition,  although farming  and  off -farm  employment  provided  similar 
incomes during the period from 1998 to 2003, farming seems to be more profitable since 2004.  Over 
the analysed period, only self-employment was generally more beneficial than farming, but even this 
advantage seems to diminish in more recent years (see Table 5 for more detailed results) .  
Further interesting  insights  can be  obtained  by looking  more  closely  at the relative remuneration 
provided  by  the  diversification  strategy.  The  r elevant  estimates  are  provided  in  Table  6  and 
summarised in Figure 2. As shown, the diversification strategy seems to only be more profitable than 
a strategy  based  on  unearned  income  sources.  However, over  the  entire  period  of  analysis , this 
strategy provided lower remuneration than all other strategies (that is, self-employment, farming, or 
off-farm).  
 
                                                           
14 All results are reported in monthly per capita income in PLN. 4 PLN roughly equals 1 EUR, whereas 3 PLN roughly equals 1 
USD.   9 
Figure  2.  Earning  premium  of  diversified-income  households  -  combining  farming  with  off-farm 
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There are two key points to note from these data. First, our results contrast with the reforms applied 
to  the  CAP,  which  significantly  intensified  governmental  efforts  to  promote  diversification.  As 
discussed  in  the  introduction,  several  policies  were  implemented  in  Poland  to  encourage  farmers  to 
part  with  agriculture.  How ever,  we  find  that  farmers  faced  strong  financial  incentives  to  do  the 
opposite.  Over  the  entire  analysed  period,  farming  was  more  profitable  than  the  diversification 
strategy. However, especially starting from 2004, off -farm employment also could not  be c onsidered 
an  attractive  alternative.  Moreover,  our  results  suggest  that  although  diversified  households  could 
have  been  attracted  by  off -farm  employment,  they  also  have  strong  incentives  to  move  back  to 
farming.  All  of these  findings  could  explain  why  the programmes in  Poland  encouraging  farmers  to 
diversify  their  activities   have  been  only  moderately  successful ,  notwithstanding  the  high  hopes 
pinned on them. 
Secondly,  although  it  is  widely  acknowledged  that  Polish  farmers  benefited  from  the  CAP, we  show 
that  joining  the  EU  in  May  2004  not  only  improved  farm  incomes  in  absolute  terms,  but  also 
contributed to a significant improvement in farmers’ position relative to other rural occupations. 
After 2004, the income of households that solely rely on farming increased in comparison to all other 
households;  this  effect  is  quantitatively  large.  For  example,  although  there  was  no  difference 
between off-farm employment and farming in 1998–2003, in the years since, the latter strategy has 
produced  higher  remuneration  (9–23  percent,  depending  on  the  year).  A  similar  tendency  is 
observed when farming is compared to a diversification strategy. Before the accession to the EU, the 
difference in returns from these two strategies favoured farmers by 7–22 percent, depending on the 
year. After the EU accession, however, this difference increased to 25–50 percent.
15  
Interestingly, in contrast to what is observed for farm households,  the year 2004 is not a ‘dividing 
line’  for  diversified  households.  As  clearly  depicted  in  Figure  2,  the  income  difference  between 
diversified households and those relying on off-farm employment is very similar across the analysed 
period.  This  suggests  that  the  former  did  not  profit  from  the  higher  returns  from  farming  that 
obviously improved the situation of households living only off agricultural income.  
                                                           
15 To confirm the robustness of our results, we re-estimate earning differentials between farmers and the diversified 
households with land endowments that we include in the set of control variables in the propensity score model. Although 
the estimates are slightly smaller for 2001–2006 and slightly higher for 1998–1999 and 2007–2008 than those in Panel B of 
Table 5, they lead to the same conclusions. For brevity, we do not report these results here; they are available upon request 
from the authors.   10 
Although these results are interesting, they are based only on reported household income. It is often 
argued that publicly collected data do not cover all income sources because of the still-large shadow 
economy, especially in rural areas. In our case, the data do not contain any information about illegal 
sources of income. Therefore, respondents may  have tried to hide income sources that are not 
officially declared, thus biasing our estimates. To check the robustness of our results, we repeat the 
matching exercise, but his time  using monthly expenditures (instead of monthly income) as our 
outcome variable. Our data contain very precise information on household total spending, which is 
difficult to manipulate because it is tabulated by summing up daily expenditures. The results of this 
robustness check are reported in Table 7. Obviously, these results cannot be identical to those based 
on  earnings  because  households  might  differ  in  their  saving  and  investment  behaviour  and 
experience  different  prices,  and  because  farmers  might  consume  some  of  their  own  products. 
Nevertheless, they show that on average farmers spend more than households that rely on off-farm 
employment and that diversifying households spend much less than farmers do. This gap is especially 
notable after 2004 and increases over time. Overall, this leads us to conclude that our earlier findings 
are quite robust.  
Although these results already form an interesting picture, a more detailed investigation may also be 
necessary  to  further exploit  the  important  sources  of  heterogeneity  across rural  households.  As 
noted in Section 2, a household income strategy may strongly be influenced by access to unearned 
income and human capital. The former is likely to affect the reservation wage, whereas the latter 
determines the set of available strategies and the level of earning possibilities. Land endowments are 
another crucial factor that may determine income strategies in rural areas. Therefore, we next look 
at these three issues in a more detailed way. We also use these additional investigations as a further 
check of the robustness of our earlier results.  
 
5.3 The role of unearned income 
Whether an unearned income  affects household choices is an important question from a policy 
perspective, as in most cases unearned income comes from government transfers to households in 
the form of pensions, social or family allowances, and unemployment subsidies, for example. To 
study this issue, we complement our earlier findings (see Table 5, Panel D, and Table 6, Panel C) by 
investigating earning differentials between households that rely solely on labour income and those 
that combine labour income with  government transfers.
16 Our analysis is based on comparisons 
between  households  in which  unearned income constitutes more than 25   percent  of  the  total 
income and households in which income from labour constitutes more than 75 percent of the total 
income.  The relevant results are reported in  Table  8,  which  compares income  for six different 
strategies. In three strategies, unearned income does not constitute an important share of total 
income  from  farming,  diversification,  and  off-farm  employment.  In  another   three  strategies, 
unearned income is an important addition (constituting more than 25 percent of total income) to the 
income from labour/farming, diversification, and off-farm employment.  
Figure 3 summarises these results by depicting the estimates from local linear matching. Clearly, in all 
comparisons, households with income coming mainly from labour are bett er off than households 
that rely on more than 25 percent unearned income. Diversifying households generally have smaller 
incomes than other households do, and their situation does not get better with additional unearned 
income.  However,  except  for  the last two years ,  we find no statistically significant difference 
between households that diversify their income sources but do not rely on additional unearned 
income and those that receive substantial transfers from the government (see also Table 8, Panel A). 
                                                           
16 Note that in earlier comparisons, we used households that rely solely on unearned transfers. Here, we 
instead investigate the income situation of households that combine these transfers with labour income.    11 
This  suggests  that  during  the  analysed  period,  diversified  households  might  have  had  reduced 
incentives to look for productive activities, as this would not have improved their financial situation.  
 
Figure 3. Income differences between households that rely solely on earned income and those who 
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 5.4 The role of human capital  
As  argued  above,  the  results  discussed  previously  may  mask  important  differences  between 
household assets that pursue similar strategies. Although matching assures that similar households 
are compared, the results are based on averages across all households in each group. The result is 
that matching estimates allow for heterogeneity in a very general way. However, income differentials 
might vary with household characteristics and lead to large  income variation  within a particular 
group of households. The following section tries to address these issues by further decomposing 
earning differentials based on the level of household human capital. 
Human capital is probably the most important characteristic that affects not only household choices 
but also how successfully households pursue different income strategies. Therefore, we re-analyse 
per capita income for households that rely solely on farming and compare it to that of households 
with different income strategies, this time looking at earning differences between households that 
differ  according  to  the  education  level  of  the  head  of  the  household.  In  the  previous  analysis, 
education level was coded into five categories; here, to have a sufficient number of observations for 
these additional investigations, we re-code it into three categories: (i) those with higher or secondary 
education;  (ii)  those  with  vocational  secondary  education;  and  (iii)  those  with  lower  secondary, 
primary, or no education.
17 The relevant results are presented in Table 9 and summarised in Figures 
4, 5, and 6.  
As shown in  Figure  4,  among  households  whose head  finished  higher  or secondary education, 
farming  produces  returns  that  are  comparable  to  those  of  o ff-farm  employment  and  self -
employment, whereas relying on pensions and social allowances  as well as relying on diversified 
income provides lower remuneration. In other words, for households with relatively high human 
capital endowments, off-farm employment seems to be a financially attractive alternative to farming. 
However, any other strategy that relies on  government transfers or on the mixing of farm and off-
farm income sources is far less beneficial. One possible explanation is that for households that have 
high levels of human capital, focusing on a single income source is more beneficial due to  higher 
                                                           
17 Using international standards, this is equivalent to an ISCED level of 3A/B or higher for the first group, 3C for 
the second, and 2 or lower for the last group.   12 
returns from specialisation (Deininger and Olinto, 2001). It is easier for highly educated farmers to 
invest in larger farms and new technologies that open new possibilities and provide stable income. 
Similarly, for those with higher or secondary education, opportunities for off-farm employment are 
usually much larger than for those with lesser education.  
 
Figure  4.  Returns  to  farming  compared  to  other  income  strategies  for  households  whose  head 
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Figure 5 provides similar information as Figure 4 but instead examines households whose heads have 
vocational education (secondary education that gives vocational training but not direct access to 
higher education). The Figure compares how the income of farmers differs from the remuneration 
enjoyed  by  other  households.  As  discussed  previously,  diversification  and  relying  on  unearned 
income provide much smaller benefits; off-farm employment also seems to be less beneficial since 
2004.  Moreover,  although  farming  provided  slightly  lower  returns  than  self-employment  before 
2004, in more recent years, these two strategies produced more similar financial returns. In sum, it 
seems that among households in which the head has vocational education, farming is more attractive 
than other strategies, especially since 2004; this, once again, highlights the importance of the EU 
accession.  
 
Figure  5.  Returns  to  farming  compared  to  other  income  strategies  for  households  whose  head 
completed vocational secondary education. 
   13 
Finally, Figure 6 provides similar comparisons for households in which the household head has the 
lowest level of education. As noted previously, the income of households relying solely on farming is 
compared with income of households that pursue different income strategies. However, this time 
the results are clearly different from those obtained for households with higher levels of human 
capital. Before 2004, off-farm employment and diversification provided returns similar to farming. 
This  is  notable,  as  diversification  was  significantly  less  beneficial  than  farming  or  off-farm 
employment for other levels of educational attainment. After 2004, farming provided higher income 
than  these  two  strategies.  Although  relying  on  government  transfers  (social  allowances  and 
pensions) seem again to be the least favourable option, differences in income among the different 
income strategies are much smaller in this case than for better-educated households. Finally, over 
the analysed period, self-employment provided either similar or only slightly higher returns than 
farming. 
 
Figure  6.  Returns  to  farming  compared  to  other  income  strategies  for  households  whose  head 
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Overall,  we  conclude  that  there  are  important  differences  in  relative  returns  to  education  in  rural 
areas.  Not  surprisingly,  parting  with  agriculture  seems  to  be  feasible  strategy  for  those  with  the 
highest  education  level , because working  off -farm  can  provide  such  individuals  with  remuneration 
that  is  comparable  to  working  in  agricult ure.  For  those  with  lower  levels  of  education, however, 
farming  seems  to  be  the  most  profitable  strategy,  not  counting  self -employment,  especially  after 
2004.  Again,  our  results  point  to  the  importance  of  the  EU  accession , which  seems  to  have  brought 
the  h ighest  relative  benefits  to  farms  with  household  head s having  either intermediary  or  lower 
education. 
 
5.5 The role of land endowments 
As mentioned earlier, it is reasonable to assume that the income strategies of rural households are 
highly dependent on their land endowments, which are likely to affect not only choices of income 
sources but also levels of returns. In theory, households can freely acquire or sell land assets. One 
can convincingly argue that households that want to diversify their income source can sell their land 
assets and completely leave agriculture, whereas households that prefer farming to other kinds of 
employment  might  acquire  new  land  to  increase  their  efficiency  and  returns.  Thus,  comparing 
households that have more or fewer land assets can be more useful for understanding the transition   14 
process in rural areas than a comparison of the opportunities and returns to households based on 
their inherent characteristics.
18 However, land acquisition might be constrained by limited access to 
credit or uncertainty related to high fluctuations in agricultural markets. Thus, especially in transition 
countries where markets are imperfect and information is more costly, households may keep their 
assets or make no attempt to acquire new land even when that might be profitable. 
Using the results of the previous sub-section, we analyse how income returns to different strategies 
differ in terms of land assets and human capital level. This addresses the well-known argument that, 
in transition economies, some households—particularly those with low or outdated human capital 
assets—might retain their agricultural activities simply because they lack other opportunities. We 
again classify households by  the education level of  the head of the household, producing three 
groups, but then combine that with land assets lower than 5 ha and equal to or higher than 5 ha. Five 
hectares  can  be  considered  as  the  lower  limit  of  land  assets  that  can  be  used  for  agricultural 
production in Poland.
19 To have a sufficient number of observations for meaningful comparisons, we 
grouped observations into three periods: 1998 –2000,  2001–2004,  and  2005–2008.  The  relevant 
results are presented in Table 10 and summarised in Figures 7 and 8.
20 
 
Figure 7. Earning differentials (monthly disposa ble income per capita in PLN) for households that 















Figure  7 depicts results  for  households  that  have  no  or  limited  land  assets  using  resul ts  for  the  most 
recent  period,  namely,  2005–2008.  These  households  are  probably  in  the  process  of  leaving 
agricultural production, although not all of them are able to find profitable off-farm employment. 
Clearly, off-farm employment provides much higher returns for all  households regardless of the 
education  level;  however,  the  difference  is  much  smaller,  on  the  border  of  significance,  for 
households  with  lower  human  capital  levels  (see  also  Table  10).  However,  both  farming  and 
                                                           
18 Similar arguments are sometimes made regarding educational attainment, for example, that households with 
lower human capital assets can invest in better education, which, over the long term, could affect their income. 
However, although human capital assets can be acquired like other types of capital, including land, not all 
individuals can be equally successful in this process because of differences in their inherit capabilities. Thus, for 
some individuals further investments into human capital can be impossible or very costly, whereas the price of 
land is the same for all households. 
19 In practice, larger land endowments are needed for agricultural production to be profitable, although the 
results for a 10 ha-threshold were almost identical. However, the sample size limited most comparisons. 
20 Obviously, some comparisons cannot be made because only a few households rely on off-farm employment 
but keep high land assets. Comparisons with fewer than 50 observations per category were omitted.   15 
diversified households have higher returns than households relying mainly on unearned income. In 
this case, there is no clear difference between education levels. Finally, farming provides higher 
returns than diversification only for educated households, whereas there is little difference for those 
with  lower  education  levels.  Results  for  other  periods  are  similar,  showing  some  evidence  of 
increasing returns from off-farm employment among highly educated households (see Table 10). 
Figure 8 is analogous to Figure 7 but compares the income of households that have more than 5 ha 
of land assets. Two periods, 1998–2000 and 2005–2008, are compared. Changes over time show how 
financial returns were influencing rural household to combine agricultural activities with off-farm 
employment or to leave the labour market and rely on unearned income. Clearly, the income of 
farmers increased in relative terms from 1998–2000 to 2005–2008. There is only one exception: 
households with higher or secondary education had similarly higher returns over the analysed period 
in  comparison  to  diversifying  households.  For  less-educated  households,  returns  from  farming 
increased in relative terms; however, they were relatively low in 1998–2008. Thus, in recent years 
farming  was  more  beneficial  than  diversification  in  relative  terms  for  all  households.  Similarly, 
unearned income became even less attractive across time for all households, regardless of education 
levels. 
 
Figure 8. Earning differentials (monthly disposable income per capita in PLN) for households that 































In  summary ,  these  results  support  our  earlier  findings  that  households  with  the  highest  human 
capital  assets  are  more  attracted  by  off -farm  employment,  whereas  all  households  should  prefer 
employment to relying on state transfers. Importantly, in addition to the level of education, access to 
land  assets  also  substantially  affects  the  relative  profitability  of  different  income  strategies.  On 
average,  farming  provided  higher  remuneration  than  diversification,  but  this  difference  is 
quantitatively  small  and  statistically  insignificant  for households with  the lowest  education  level  and 
few land assets.  
Overall, we conclude that during 1998–2008, financial incentives did not encourage farms to diversify 
outside agriculture, except for households with the highest human capital assets, which can benefit 
from  off-farm  employment.  Income  diversification  is  the  least  profitable  employment  strategy, 
whereas unearned income produces less income than employment. This may provide an explanation 
for the relatively modest success of measures aimed at promoting income diversification in rural 
areas in Poland. Note that these results may  also serve as an explanation for the more general 
pattern of agricultural labour adjustment produced from a macroeconomic perspective (Dries and 
Swinnen, 2002; Swinnen et al., 2005). We provide evidence that shifting toward family farms during   16 
transition,  a  phenomenon  observed  at  a macrolevel,  had  a strong  micro-foundation  in terms of 
financial returns. Our results also complement earlier studies on barriers to off-farm diversification 
(Chaplin et al., 2004). Although these studies show that moving outside agriculture was hampered by 
low human capital and remote location, we argue that there were no financial incentives for this shift 
to happen, especially for households that do possess land and have limited human capital assets. 
Notably, these financial incentives discouraging farmers to part with agriculture seem to be strongly 
affected by the EU accession. Our results support the view that joining the EU in 2004 improved the 




It  is  generally  believed  that  the  economic  diversification  of  rural  areas  may contribute to more 
efficient resource allocation and help reduce poverty. In this paper, we took a closer look at this issue 
by examining an extensive data set from Poland spanning 1998–2008. In theory, diversification could 
provide an attractive alternative to other income strategies, as rural households may still use their 
agricultural  assets  while  also  taking  profitable  off-farm  employment.  Using  the  propensity  score 
matching method, we demonstrate, however, that returns from diversification are lower than those 
from farming or off-farm employment in rural Poland. Diversification is only preferable in comparison 
to relying on government transfers (pensions or social allowances). Moreover, our estimates suggest 
that after Poland joined the European Union, rural households relying on farm income were better 
off  than  those  relying  on  off-farm  employment.  The  latter  strategy  is  more  profitable  only  for 
households with the highest levels of human capital and few land assets. On average, the highest 
remuneration was provided by self-employment, but this strategy is only rarely employed.  
Overall, our results suggest that in 1998–2008, farmers lacked financial incentives to (partly) quit 
agriculture. Since 2004, when Poland joined the EU, returns from farming have been significantly 
higher than earnings from other income sources. Hence, it is rather unlikely that there will be a 
radical shift in this trend in the near future. We explain this phenomenon by considering the direct 
benefit that Polish farmers gain from the CAP. The exact transmission mechanism of this effect is an 
interesting area for future research.    17 
References 
Abadie, A., Imbens, G.W. (2008), On the failure of the bootstrap for matching estimators, Econometrica 76(6), 
pp. 1537-1557.  
Ahituv, A., Kimhi, A. (2006). Simultaneous estimation of works choices and the level of farm activity using panel 
data, European Review of Agricultural Economics 33, pp. 49-71.  
Benjamin, C. (1994), The Growing Importance of Diversification Activities for French Farm Households, Journal 
of Rural Studies 10(4), pp. 31-342.  
Blundell  R.,  Costa  Dias  M.  (2008),  Alternative  Approaches  to  Evaluation  in  Empirical  Microeconomics,  IZA 
Discussion Paper, no 3800. 
Błąd, M. (2006), Dywersyfikacja ekonomiczna wsi, in: Wilkin, J., Nurzyoska, I. (eds.) Polska Wieś 2006, FDPA, 
Warszawa, pp. 75-86.  
Brada, J. C. (1989), Technical Progress and Factor Utilization in Eastern European Economic Growth, Economica 
56, pp. 433– 448. 
Chaplin H., Davidova S., Gorton M. (2004), Agricultural Adjustment and the Diversification of Farm Households 
and Corporate Farms in Central Europe, Journal of Rural Studies 20, pp. 61-77. 
Chaplin  H.,  Davidova  S.,  Gorton  M.  (2005),  Impediments  to  Employment  and  Enterprise  Diversification: 
Evidence from Small-Scale Farms in Poland, Paper prepared for presentation at the 99th seminar of the 
European Association of Agricultural Economists, Copenhagen, 24-27 August. 
CSO (1999), Metodyka badania budżetów gospodarstw domowych, Warszawa, GUS. 
CSO (2007), Budżety gospodarstw domowych w Polsce w 2006 r., Warszawa, GUS.  
Deininger K. and Olinto P., 2001, Rural Nonfarm Employment and Income Diversification in Colombia, World 
Development 29(3), pp. 455-465. 
Dries L., and Swinnen, J.F.M. (2002), Institutional Reform and Labor Reallocation During Transition: Theory and 
Evidence from Polish Agriculture, World Development 30(3), pp. 457-474.   
Dwyer, J. and Findeis, J. (2008), Human and Social Capital in Rural Development –EU and US Perspectives, 
EuroChoices 7(1).  
Goodwin, B.K., Holt, M.T. (2002), Parametric and Semiparametric Modeling of the Off-Farm Labour Supply of 
Agrarian Households in Transition Bulgaria, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 84(1), pp. 184-
209.  
Grootaert,  C.  (1998).  Social  capital:  The  missing  link?  Social  Capital  Initiative  Working  Paper  3/1998, 
Washington DC, USA: The World Bank. 
Hazell P. and Haggblade S., 1990, Rural-urban growth linkages in India, PRE Working Paper Series No. 430, 
Agriculture and Rural Development  Department, World Bank. 
Heckman J. J., Ichimura H., Todd P. (1997) ”Matching as an Econometric Evaluation Estimator: Evidence From 
Evaluating a Job Training Program”, The Reviev of Economic Studies, vol 64/4. pp. 605-654. 
Huffman, W.E. (1980), Farm and off-farm work decisions: the role of human capital, The Review of Economics 
and Statistics 62, pp. 14–23.  
Jackman, R. (1994), Economic Policy and Employment in the Transition Economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe: What Have We Learned? International Labor Review 133, (3), pp. 327– 345.  
Jolliffe, D. (2004). The impact of education in rural Ghana: examining household labour allocation and returns 
on and off the farm. Journal of Development Economics 73, pp. 287–314. 
Juvancic, L., Erjavec, E. (2005), Intertemporal analysis of employment decisions on agricultural holdings  in 
Slovenia, Agricultural Economics 33, pp. 153-161.  
Kimhi,  A.  (2004).  Family  Composition  and  Off-Farm  Participation  Decisions  in  Israeli  Farm  Households, 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 86(2), pp. 502-512.  
Kimhi,  A.  (2000).  Is  part-time  farming  really  a  step  in  the  way  out  of  agriculture?  American  Journal  of 
Agricultural Economics Vol. 82, pp. 38–48.    18 
Kimhi, A. (1996). Demographic Composition of Farm Households and its Effects on Time Allocation, J. Pop. Econ. 
9, pp. 429-429.  
Knack,  S.,  Keefer,  P.  (1997).  Does  social  capital  have  an  economic  payoff?  A  cross  country  investigation. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (4), pp. 1251-1288.  
Koenker R., Basset G. (1978), Regression Quantiles, Econometrica vol 46/1 pp. 33-50. 
Koenker R., Portnoy S. (1987), L-Estimation for Linear Models, Journal of American Statistical Association Vol. 
82, pp. 851-857. 
Kolarska-Bobioska, L., Rosner, A., Wilkin, J. (2001): Przyszłośd wsi polskiej, in: Kolarska-Bobioska L., Rosner A., 
Wilkin J. (red.), Przyszłość wsi polskiej. Wizje, strategie, koncepcje, Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Warszawa  
Lanjouw J.O., Lanjouw P. (2001), The rural non-farm sector: issues and evidence from developing countries, 
Agricultural Economics 26, pp. 1-23. 
Lass, D.A., Findeis, J.L., Hallberg, M.C. (1991). Factors Affecting the Supply of Off-farm Labor: A Review of 
Empirical Evidence, in: Hallberg, M.C., Findeis, J.L., Lass, D.A. (eds.) Multiple Job-holding among Farm 
Families, Ames IA: Iowa State University Press.  
Lee, M-J. (2005). Micro-Econometric for Policy, Program, and Treatment Effects, Oxford University Press. 
Lerman, Z, Csaki, C., Feder, G. (2004). Agriculture in Transition: Land Policies and Evolving Farm Structures in 
Post-Soviet Countries, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
Macours,  K.,  Swinnen,  J.F.M.  (2005).  Agricultural  Labour  Adjustments  in  Transition  Countries:  The  Role  of 
Migration and Impact on Poverty, Review of Agricultural Economics, 27(3), 405-11. 
Narayan, D., Pritchett, L. (1999). Cents and sociability: Household income and social capital in rural Tanzania. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 47 (4), pp. 871-897. 
Phimister, E., Roberts, D., Gilbert, A. (2004), The Dynamics of Farm Incomes: Panel data analysis using the Farm 
Accounts Survey, Journal of Agricultural Economics 55(2), pp. 197-220.  
RDP, (2010). Polish rural development plan 2007-2013, (version from march 2010). www.minrol.gov.pl  
Reardon T., Berdegue J., Escobar G. (2001), Rural nonfarm employment and incomes in Latin America: overview 
and policy implications, World Development 29(3), pp. 395-409. 
Reardon T., Taylor J.E., Stamoulis K., Lanjouw P., Baliscan A. (2000), Effects of non-farm employment on rural 
income inequality in developing countries: an investment perspective, Journal of Agricultural Economics 
51 (2), pp. 266-288. 
Reardon T. (1997), Using evidence of household income diversification to inform study of the rural nonfarm 
labor market in Africa, World Development 25 (5), pp. 735-748. 
Rosenbaum P. A., Rubin D. B. (1983). The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for 
Causal Effects, Biometrika 70(1), pp. 41-55. 
Rozelle  S.,  Taylor  J.  E.,  DeBrauw  A.  (1999),  Migration  remittances  and  agricultural  productivity  in  China, 
American Economic Review 89(2), pp.287-291.  
SAPARD  (2007),  Analiza  wyników  realizacji  poszczególnych  działao  Programu  SAPARD  w  świetle  celów 
Programu  oraz  wpływ  zmian  społeczno-ekonomicznych  na  realizację  Programu  w  latach  2002-2006, 
http://www.funduszestrukturalne.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/4E41CBAE-F849-48BE-BAC9-
0614753930AA/37605/analizasapard.pdf (accessed in October 2010) 
Seeth, H. T., Chachnov, S., Surinov, A., von Braun, J. (1998), Russian Poverty: Muddling through Economic 
Transition with Garden Plots, World Development 26(9), pp. 1611– 1623.  
SPO (2008), Wykorzystanie środków Sektorowego Programu Operacyjnego „Restrukturyzacja i modernizacja 
sektora żywnościowego oraz rozwój obszarów wiejskich” w województwach. (accessed in October 2010) 
Swinnen J.F.M., Dries, L., and Macours, K. (2005), Transition and agricultural labor, Agricultural Economics 32, 
pp. 15-34.  
Tokle, J.G., Huffman, W.E. (1991), Local economic conditions and wage labour decisions of farm and rural 
nonfarm couples, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 73, pp. 652–670.  
Wilkin J. (ed.) (2003), Podstawy Strategii Zintegrowanego Rozwoju Rolnictwa i Obszarów Wiejskich w Polsce, 
WNE UW, Warszawa.  
Ziętara, W. (2001): Rynek Ziemi w Polsce w okresie powojennym, in: Rynki wiejskie: ziemia, kapitał, praca, 
IRWiR, Warszawa.    19 
Annex with tables. 
Table 1. Average nominal disposable monthly income per capita (PLN) in rural areas and farm households 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Rural areas  440,95  482,57  511,96  526,46  530,3  555,29  592,82  659,29  744,44  835,85 
Farm  411,37  455,99  497,54  571,83  474,31  541,00  606,17  689,75  846,76  887,35 
Farm/rural  93%  94%  97%  109%  89%  97%  102%  105%  114%  106% 
Source: CSO var. vol. and own calculations based on the Household Budget Surveys. 
 
Table 2. Sample characteristics: percentage of rural households with respect to their main source of income 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Off-farm employment  7,6%  7,5%  7,1%  7,3%  7,2%  7,9%  8,6%  9,3%  10,1%  11,2%  12,3% 
Combining off- and on-farm income  4,5%  3,9%  3,8%  3,4%  3,3%  3,2%  2,9%  2,8%  2,8%  2,8%  2,9% 
Farm income  6,7%  6,1%  5,8%  5,3%  5,1%  4,6%  5,0%  4,9%  4,8%  4,7%  4,4% 
Self-Employment  1,8%  2,0%  1,9%  2,2%  2,1%  2,1%  2,1%  2,1%  2,2%  2,3%  2,7% 
Budget transfers  19,6%  20,5%  21,8%  22,4%  22,9%  23,2%  22,3%  22,1%  21,3%  20,1%  18,7% 
Other transfers  2,3%  2,4%  2,6%  2,3%  2,2%  2,1%  2,1%  2,0%  2,0%  2,0%  2,1% 
Off-farm employment + transfers  2,9%  3,3%  3,2%  3,5%  3,7%  3,4%  3,7%  3,9%  4,0%  4,2%  4,6% 
Combining off- and on-farm + transfers  2,1%  2,1%  1,8%  1,6%  1,7%  1,6%  1,5%  1,3%  1,3%  1,5%  1,2% 
Farm income  + transfers  2,5%  2,3%  2,0%  2,0%  1,9%  1,9%  1,8%  1,6%  1,6%  1,3%  1,1% 
No. of rural household  10 716  10 664  12 562  10 789  10 801  10 641  10 508  13 184  15 812  15 758  15 739 
Source: Own computations based on Household Budget Surveys. 
 
 
Table 3. Rural households’ mean equivalent monthly income per person, by main source of income (in PLN deflated 
to 2005 using Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices) 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Off-farm employment  610,12  614,02  667,57  636,88  619,99  631,71  629,61  646,84  703,63  767,21  847,12 
Combining off- and on-farm income  481,75  482,62  492,74  477,16  463,62  486,55  466,62  481,00  524,70  606,39  676,79 
Farm income  678,27  673,93  653,60  671,44  736,28  634,97  716,63  790,47  841,90  1055,99  1104,57 
Self-Employment  659,29  679,76  659,45  683,71  738,73  728,79  713,88  739,91  830,49  879,10  972,74 
Budget transfers  557,59  542,08  521,67  533,19  529,91  545,00  550,56  570,49  607,35  653,51  694,13 
Other transfers  311,90  311,49  356,81  340,88  312,74  375,26  204,25  264,30  400,81  469,51  360,62 
Off-farm employment + transfers  553,10  573,23  557,73  570,70  582,48  573,20  580,46  572,74  595,09  642,76  712,04 
Combining off- and on-farm  + transfers  480,65  475,57  493,86  484,29  492,99  486,68  485,62  490,25  512,41  543,28  604,49 
Farm income + transfers  477,55  451,07  451,57  450,62  429,39  451,50  477,43  467,03  508,38  544,56  535,75 
Source: Own computations based on the Household Budget Survey.  20 
Table 4. Propensity score estimates: probit regressions. 
Dependent variable: 1 for households relying solely on farm income; 0 for households relying solely on off-farm income 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Age  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02 
  (6.98)  (9.22)  (7.56)  (9.97)  (8.88)  (7.97)  (8.50)  (5.86)  (5.11)  (4.97)  (5.56) 
gender (1=woman)  -0.64  -0.83  -0.89  -0.99  -0.83  -0.81  -0.89  -0.62  -0.60  -0.71  -0.72 
  (5.30)  (7.04)  (7.35)  (8.04)  (6.55)  (6.43)  (6.63)  (7.13)  (7.68)  (8.98)  (9.15) 
secondary general education  1.81  1.40  0.95  0.37  0.88  1.15  1.37  0.61  0.72  0.54  1.13 
  (3.95)  (3.18)  (2.09)  (0.84)  (1.91)  (2.23)  (2.80)  (1.78)  (2.54)  (2.06)  (4.48) 
secondary vocational education  2.24  1.99  1.70  1.59  1.49  1.84  1.94  1.62  1.38  1.21  1.30 
  (5.47)  (5.36)  (5.05)  (4.75)  (3.68)  (4.16)  (4.52)  (5.94)  (6.19)  (6.01)  (6.14) 
vocational education  2.69  2.43  2.15  2.02  2.02  2.61  2.40  1.84  1.69  1.39  1.52 
  (6.72)  (6.68)  (6.59)  (6.20)  (5.10)  (6.01)  (5.65)  (6.81)  (7.77)  (7.09)  (7.36) 
lower secondary education  3.32  2.89  2.83  2.38  2.55  3.27  2.88  2.27  2.10  1.72  1.69 
  (8.26)  (7.90)  (8.58)  (7.24)  (6.36)  (7.47)  (6.69)  (8.27)  (9.43)  (8.51)  (7.96) 
No of persons under 16  0.05  0.08  0.15  0.16  0.18  0.19  0.16  0.05  0.11  0.08  0.11 
  (1.55)  (2.28)  (4.09)  (4.29)  (4.67)  (4.45)  (4.07)  (1.75)  (4.00)  (2.88)  (4.18) 
No of persons 16-65  0.05  -0.02  0.02  -0.00  0.04  0.10  0.08  0.07  0.08  0.10  0.08 
  (1.12)  (0.45)  (0.50)  (0.11)  (0.94)  (2.53)  (1.73)  (2.18)  (2.88)  (3.49)  (3.02) 
No of persons 65+  1.69  1.67  1.50  1.63  1.41  1.66  1.76  0.89  0.83  0.77  0.75 
  (14.54)  (14.70)  (14.55)  (14.06)  (13.62)  (14.22)  (14.57)  (12.84)  (13.73)  (12.74)  (12.79) 
Constant  -3.73  -5.64  -5.03  -5.05  -5.18  -6.24  -6.87  -4.42  -4.00  -3.86  -4.46 
  (7.19)  (10.66)  (10.36)  (10.13)  (9.45)  (10.39)  (11.12)  (11.88)  (13.43)  (13.18)  (13.84) 
Observations  3 764  3 761  4 248  3 459  3 427  3 497  3 542  6 980  8 562  8 814  9 083 
Source: Own computations based on the Household Budget Survey. Note: All regressions include regional dummies (NUTS 2 level). Robust z statistics in parentheses,     21 
Table 5. Estimates of earning differentials (monthly disposable income per capita in PLN): Farm income vs. other income strategies 
   1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Panel A: Farm income vs. off-farm income 
ATT11  40,3  1,0  44,2  24,5  -0,5  -18,6  82,8  68,8  116,6  177,6  79,1 
  [15,2]  [15,0]  [17,4]  [15,9]  [20,9]  [20,6]  [17,8]  [20,2]  [22,5]  [27,1]  [25,5] 
  (22,1)  (22,6)  (21,1)  (20,3)  (29,1)  (27,2)  (25,1)  (24,9)  (25,0)  (28,9)  (30,4) 
ATTllr  59,1  0,9  37,2  6,9  11,2  -4,5  79,2  60,7  133,9  160,8  85,9 
  [12,2]  [13,8]  [15,9]  [14,7]  [20,8]  [18,4]  [14,6]  [17,3]  [19,8]  [27,0]  [23,7] 
  (20,0)  (23,9)  (20,3)  (17,1)  (27,2)  (22,7)  (21,3)  (24,8)  (24,9)  (31,9)  (25,8) 
Panel B: Farm income vs. diversified income 
ATT11  95,1  81,6  83,1  81,3  99,7  34,8  172,4  139,9  132,8  304,4  237,9 
  [17,4]  [18,1]  [16,9]  [21,3]  [23,7]  [16,8]  [22,7]  [22,4]  [21,8]  [25,8]  [30,2] 
  (24,1)  (27,7)  (23,9)  (27,8)  (36,1)  (34,2)  (35,9)  (37,6)  (31,7)  (42,1)  (42,0) 
ATTllr  114,0  91,3  69,5  81,4  122,5  82,9  136,9  151,5  160,5  234,4  233,3 
  [9,7]  [10,8]  [10,1]  [9,7]  [12,3]  [11,5]  [12,7]  [13,8]  [12,1]  [14,2]  [18,2] 
  (19,5)  (19,3)  (18,4)  (20,0)  (27,1)  (29,6)  (26,5)  (25, 5)  (25,3)  (28,3)  (27,6) 
Panel C: Farm income vs. self-employment 
ATT11  -50,7  -122,6  -122,6  -146,9  -116,7  -192,4  -129,7  -58,6  -136,8  -50,8  68,1 
  [36,3]  [37,7]  [36,7]  [36,7]  [41,2]  [45,6]  [31,3]  [38,3]  [37,8]  [41,8]  [52,3] 
  (48,0)  (46,2)  (38,7)  (46,9)  (58,3)  (49,8)  (42,4)  (50,4)  (55,4)  (60,2)  (67,6) 
ATTllr  -32,7  -124,1  -139,4  -88,9  -105,8  -154,7  -84,5  -79,6  -75,1  -77,0  -6,4 
  [23,6]  [26,0]  [22,4]  [27,0]  [35,1]  [35,5]  [26,2]  [29,3]  [23,2]  [28,8]  [36,3] 
  (35,1)  (34,3)  (26,8)  (26,4)  (37,8)  (40,1)  (39,2)  (35,3)  (37,3)  (46,7)  (46,2) 
Panel D: Farm income vs. pensions and social allowances 
ATT11  201,9  157,3  199,1  190,0  195,2  158,5  236,2  238,3  325,3  399,7  362,3 
  [14,2]  [16,2]  [15,7]  [16,9]  [21,9]  [18,9]  [18,4]  [22,2]  [21,6]  [29,8]  [27,6] 
  (18,8)  (20,7)  (18,8)  (21,2)  (22,8)  (21,2)  (21,2)  (23,1)  (22,9)  (30,5)  (28,3) 
ATTllr  194,7  154,5  205,3  177,9  197,6  157,5  227,8  246,0  321,3  378,2  359,5 
  [12,0]  [13,7]  [15,3]  [15,0]  [20,2]  [18,2]  [16,2]  [19,0]  [20,5]  [27,3]  [25,9] 
  (16,3)  (16,7)  (16,0)  (18,7)  (19,3)  (19,5)  (18,8)  (19,4)  (22,3)  (25,8)  (23,7) 
Notes: ATT11 – average treatment on the treated nearest neighbour estimator; ATTllr – average treatment on the treated local linear regression estimator; Analytical robust standard errors for clusters at primary 
sampling unit in brackets; Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) in parentheses.    22 
Table 6. Estimates of earning differentials (monthly disposable income per capita in PLN): Diversified income vs. other income strategies 
   1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Panel A: Diversified income hh vs. off-farm income 
ATT11  -41,7  -76,1  -70,0  -119,0  -93,0  -64,5  -109,0  -79,2  -111,8  -108,1  -144,3 
  [12,4]  [14,5]  [14,6]  [14,6]  [13,3]  [17,7]  [18,8]  [18,3]  [18,0]  [16,2]  [20,3] 
  (15,3)  (17,5)  (16,1)  (18,7)  (18,9)  (20,6)  (21,0)  (21,6)  (23,1)  (22,1)  (25,9) 
ATTllr  -57,8  -87,6  -59,9  -103,7  -110,5  -84,9  -91,1  -90,3  -99,8  -112,9  -115,3 
  [9,2]  [10,6]  [10,5]  [11,3]  [12,0]  [12,7]  [15,1]  [14,6]  [12,6]  [13,5]  [15,8] 
  (11,3)  (14,6)  (11,3)  (13,2)  (12,5)  (15,9)  (13,8)  (14,7)  (15,4)  (15,0)  (19,0) 
Panel B: Diversified income hh vs. self-employment 
ATT11  -134,9  -237,3  -226,6  -208,0  -265,1  -219,2  -245,1  -249,6  -248,6  -323,5  -293,7 
  [31,1]  [30,0]  [28,4]  [36,0]  [35,6]  [38,6]  [33,1]  [32,3]  [26,5]  [33,7]  [33,8] 
  (32,8)  (34,5)  (29,1)  (36,2)  (37,3)  (42,5)  (35,0)  (36,8)  (34,0)  (39,0)  (42,1) 
ATTllr  -146,6  -217,7  -221,8  -207,8  -255,5  -232,7  -245,6  -245,8  -236,4  -315,0  -275,1 
  [25,9]  [24,8]  [22,2]  [27,0]  [32,0]  [33,5]  [25,2]  [27,1]  [22,3]  [29,5]  [30,2] 
  (25,7)  (29,7)  (23,5)  (29,5)  (31,3)  (30,6)  (30,4)  (32,2)  (28,5)  (34,5)  (32,4) 
Panel C: Diversified income hh vs. pensions and social allowances 
ATT11  60,4  64,6  102,9  73,9  80,0  55,4  89,1  85,4  71,5  91,6  162,0 
  [12,8]  [15,1]  [13,6]  [14,0]  [16,5]  [16,4]  [15,8]  [18,1]  [17,8]  [17,3]  [19,5] 
  (18,0)  (18,4)  (16,5)  (21,5)  (19,5)  (20,3)  (18,4)  (19,5)  (19,8)  (24,8)  (24,8) 
ATTllr  81,2  68,4  122,0  70,3  68,3  81,1  67,3  75,4  87,7  97,9  142,3 
  [9,4]  [10,4]  [9,6]  [9,9]  [11,4]  [11,6]  [13,0]  [14,1]  [11,9]  [12,7]  [16,6] 
  (14,5)  (12,1)  (11,3)  (17,0)  (14,4)  (14,5)  (14,4)  (16,2)  (14,8)  (15,5)  (21,3) 
Note: Diversified hh – households combining off- and on-farm activities. ATT11 – average treatment on the treated nearest neighbor estimator; ATTllr – average treatment on the treated local linear regression 
estimator; Analytical robust standard errors for clusters at primary sampling unit in brackets; Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) in parentheses.   23 
Table 7. Estimates of spending differentials. 
 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Panel A: Farm households versus off-farm households 
ATT11  48,58  20,53  24,21  16,94  30,77  43,26  44,55  38,68  76,43  36,94  -6,00 
  (8,43)  (10,55)  (11,99)  (13,47)  (14,84)  (15,37)  (15,94)  (15,02)  (17,60)  (18,46)  (19,27) 
ATTllr  40,08  15,41  29,93  31,74  33,46  30,29  31,17  56,98  80,16  37,93  29,14 
  (6,67)  (8,47)  (9,60)  (10,07)  (16,14)  (15,28)  (12,44)  (14,53)  (15,12)  (17,70)  (15,19) 
Panel B: Farm households versus diversified households 
ATT11  69,55  59,66  28,63  65,27  69,61  70,05  84,03  78,75  95,22  80,90  105,89 
  (14,44)  (15,90)  (14,98)  (20,65)  (26,92)  (29,34)  (24,81)  (26,06)  (24,94)  (26,76)  (26,96) 
ATTllr  46,75  58,03  44,77  54,19  77,01  58,89  72,01  73,94  87,71  97,90  106,14 
  (11,63)  (12,15)  (12,51)  (15,11)  (21,47)  (24,69)  (17,32)  (16,36)  (18,30)  (18,69)  (22,18) 
Note: Diversified hh – households combining off- and on-farm activities. ATT11 – average treatment on the treated nearest neighbour estimator; ATTllr – average treatment on the treated local linear regression 
estimator; Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) in parentheses 
   24 
Table 8. Estimates of earning differentials: diversified income, farm income and off-farm income with and without additional unearned income 
 
   1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Panel A: Diversified income with additional unearned income versus diversified income 
ATT11  -33,2  -49,8  -21,6  3,6  8,7  -55,5  -15,8  -22,2  -24,7  -83,9  -90,5 
  (25,5)  (28,3)  (27,7)  (29,6)  (29,5)  (34,7)  (28,1)  (30,2)  (29,3)  (35,8)  (34,9) 
ATTllr  -16,1  -35,2  -24,0  -8,5  -29,1  -30,6  -6,4  -8,1  -32,0  -95,1  -105,8 
  (18,3)  (19,4)  (19,7)  (22,0)  (23,1)  (27,8)  (19,4)  (20,6)  (21,9)  (24,0)  (21,6) 
Panel B: Farm income with additional unearned transfers versus farm income 
ATT11  -217,2  -178,4  -238,8  -207,9  -238,0  -213,1  -261,9  -352,3  -261,6  -387,8  -368,4 
  (40,9)  (36,8)  (38,8)  (38,0)  (42,0)  (41,0)  (62,3)  (51,2)  (47,8)  (50,9)  (60,8) 
ATTllr  -210,1  -191,3  -288,8  -206,0  -220,6  -229,3  -272,1  -313,1  -292,5  -425,7  -388,1 
  (28,3)  (27,5   )  (26,1)  (23,4)  (32,3)  (29,6)  (38,9)  (31,9)  (32,3)  (32,8)  (37,1) 
Panel C: Off-farm employment with additional unearned transfers versus off-farm employment 
ATT11  -61,9  -44,5  -69,7  -27,8  -60,9  -69,7  -70,2  -28,4  -59,1  -123,1  -122,7 
  (24,9)  (25,1)  (26,0)  (27,1)  (30,5)  (25,1)  (26,7)  (24,1)  (23,4)  (23,3)  (22,8) 
ATTllr  -61,3  -51,7  -85,8  -48,9  -68,4  -50,8  -55,3  -42,6  -69,9  -118,5  -128,2 
  (18,0)  (18,9)  (19,2)  (22,5)  (23,0)  (17,1)  (17,6)  (18,7)  (15,6)  (16,0)  (19,6) 
Panel D: Diversified income with additional unearned income versus off-farm employment 
ATT11  -101,1  -165,6  -147,0  -110,0  -167,1  -169,5  -128,6  -90,0  -143,1  -203,9  -196,4 
  (29,6)  (34,5)  (31,3)  (29,6)  (35,1)  (37,5)  (35,0)  (42,3)  (34,6)  (36,1)  (38,5) 
ATTllr  -129,6  -160,8  -134,9  -136,1  -168,4  -172,1  -134,1  -114,5  -165,1  -220,8  -220,9 
  (21,4)  (24,7)  (21,9)  (23,9)  (26,9)  (28,7)  (19,3)  (23,5)  (23,5)  (24,0)  (23,9) 
Panel E: Diversified income with additional unearned income versus farm income 
ATT11  -251,7  -184,4  -222,1  -202,2  -176,0  -240,8  -165,8  -207,2  -245,6  -401,4  -291,7 
  (44,5)  (44,8)  (42,0)  (42,1)  (50,0)  (49,0)  (47,7)  (58,7)  (47,6)  (50,5)  (60,4) 
ATTllr  -209,8  -193,8  -229,2  -161,6  -220,0  -233,2  -240,0  -245,1  -247,8  -413,2  -349,3 
  (28,3)  (32,5)  (30,3)  (27,2)  (41,1)  (41,4)  (35,0)  (39,4)  (37,1)  (35,9)  (35,7) 
Note: Diversified hh – households combining off- and on-farm activities. ATT11 – average treatment on the treated nearest neighbour estimator; ATTllr – average treatment on the treated local linear regression 
estimator; Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) in parentheses.   25 
Table 9. Estimates of earning differentials, by household head’s educational attainment level (monthly disposable income per capita in PLN): Farming vs. other income strategies  
 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Panel A: Farm hh versus off-farm hh with upper secondary or higher education 
ATT  -17,20  -31,02  7,06  -47,23  -74,23  -42,17  -50,27  -22,43  68,85  48,39  60,70 
  [42,90]  [36,77]  [42,75]  [33,65]  [44,94]  [53,23]  [51,80]  [44,76]  [45,90]  [64,85]  [50,72] 
  (49,80)  (43,22)  (45,24)  (52,04)  (48,61)  (56,13)  (53,22)  (43,46)  (47,62)  (63,00)  (56,47) 
Panel B: Farm hh versus off-farm hh with vocational education 
ATT  66,72  7,63  33,51  23,05  41,19  18,53  111,47  88,75  137,70  201,70  101,10 
  [19,36]  [20,93]  [21,29]  [20,85]  [26,24]  [23,60]  [19,31]  [20,10]  [23,84]  [26,49]  [24,43] 
  (27,26)  (27,03)  (28,63)  (24,46)  (28,00)  (29,52)  (29,59)  (26,17)  (29,51)  (31,03)  (28,88) 
Panel C: Farm hh versus off-farm hh with primary or lower secondary education 
ATT  58,49  -22,83  27,31  11,89  47,79  -56,17  95,68  61,65  150,49  147,48  26,12 
  [19,46]  [21,81]  [20,71]  [21,58]  [24,53]  [22,18]  [22,16]  [29,25]  [30,68]  [37,55]  [38,09] 
  (33,89)  (44,88)  (33,93)  (32,23)  (48,40)  (42,34)  (35,16)  (38,70)  (36,99)  (43,87)  (42,20) 
Panel D: Farm hh versus diversified hh with upper secondary or higher education 
ATT  58,32  108,70  117,01  69,62  78,02  135,31  197,91  118,01  254,83  239,61  220,12 
  [38,82]  [36,50]  [44,27]  [32,92]  [40,94]  [49,64]  [50,19]  [40,97]  [40,47]  [67,69]  [52,59] 
  (48,18)  (46,07)  (47,01)  (41,93)  (59,13)  (67,36)  (57,15)  (46,42)  (49,94)  (62,41)  (67,31) 
Panel E: Farm hh versus diversified hh with vocational education 
ATT  147,92  103,23  117,86  143,90  126,90  128,23  180,00  148,67  206,48  280,14  200,39 
  [18,21]  [19,30]  [20,77]  [20,83]  [25,57]  [21,15]  [21,07]  [20,41]  [24,86]  [28,03]  [23,00] 
  (21,78)  (24,18)  (25,44)  (20,13)  (31,68)  (27,50)  (28,34)  (26,85)  (30,66)  (30,93)  (31,38) 
Panel F: Farm hh versus diversified hh with primary or lower secondary education 
ATT  75,43  47,71  15,09  35,91  130,41  -20,85  48,69  124,46  192,24  217,46  124,44 
  [19,31]  [19,08]  [18,76]  [22,41]  [30,18]  [23,10]  [23,69]  [27,88]  [31,41]  [32,19]  [53,93] 
  (29,93)  (29,09)  (31,03)  (39,98)  (45,01)  (43,62)  (55,79)  (38,21)  (41,54)  (41,65)  (64,97) 
Notes: Diversified hh – households combining off- and on-farm activities. ATT – average treatment on the treated local linear regression estimator; Analytical robust standard errors for clusters at primary sampling 
unit in brackets; Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) in parentheses.    26 
Table 10. Earning differentials across occupations and education levels 
 
Secondary and higher 
under 5 hectares 
Secondary and higher 
over 5 hectares 
Vocational 
under 5 hectares 
Vocational 
over 5 hectares 
Primary 
under 5 hectares 
Primary 
over 5 hectares 
   98-01  02-04  05-08  98-01  02-04  05-08  98-01  02-04  05-08  98-01  02-04  05-08  98-01  02-04  05-08  98-01  02-04  05-08 
Panel A: Farm hh versus off-farm hh 
ATT  -95,25  -94,18  -115,02      80,41  -0,07  -83,34  -26,89      229,86  -28,43  -58,12  -52,11      95,02 
  (50,02)  (69,30)  (61,33)        (32,49)  (23,79)  (34,31)  (28,60)        (16,32)  (24,26)  (39,48)  (29,23)        (19,73) 
Panel B: Farm hh versus diversified hh 
ATT  21,64  116,79  112,05  198,88  149,86  168,17  74,39  26,16  86,74  124,91  158,94  199,04  37,01  -3,62  -2,55  69,48  161,88  169,72 
  (48,52)  (66,14)  (58,27)  (27,73)  (58,14)  (28,48  (23,33)  (31,16)  (30,19)  (15,98)  (24,93)  (16,55)  (23,78)  (37,66)  (29,33)  (15,18)  (31,09)  (23,50) 
Panel C Farm hh versus unearned income hh 
ATT  95,25  145,78  157,43  263,46  281,93  445,92  118,31  55,55  172,57  247,32  204,41  433,56  127,25  58,97  116,85  203,01  286,43  361,49 
  (48,04)  (70,21)  (67,78)  (27,46)  (51,33)  (30,63)  (22,57)  (37,84)  (27,91)  (15,97)  (26,40)  (15,73)  (23,62)  (33,97)  (30,05)  (14,73)  (31,64)  (23,76) 
Notes: Diversified hh – households combining off- and on-farm activities. ATT – average treatment on the treated local linear regression estimator; Analytical robust standard errors for clusters at primary sampling 
unit in parentheses  
 
 
Table 11. Distribution of land endowments among rural households in 1998 and in 2008 (in hectare per household). 
   1998  2008 
   10th 
percentile 
25th 











Off-farm employment  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0 
Combining off- and on-farm income  0.0  0.1  1.2  3.3  6.2  0.0  0.9  2.6  5.1  8.8 
Farm income  3.0  5.1  8.5  13.3  20.5  3.3  6.1  10.0  16.5  26.0 
Unearned income  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.7  3.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.5   27 
Table 12. Covariates averages for one to one nearest neighbour matching and diversified versus rural household comparison. 
  pscore  age  gender  secondary general  secondary vocational 
year  Control  Matched 
Control  Treated  bias 
reduc  Control  Matched 
Control  Treated  bias 
reduc  Control  Matched 
Control  Treated  bias 
reduc  Control  Matched 
Control  Treated  bias 
reduc  Control  Matched 
Control  Treated  bias 
reduc 
1998  0,33  0,43  0,52  0,47  43,65  41,11  40,12  0,28  1,16  1,18  1,23  0,80  0,02  0,03  0,05  0,66  0,11  0,15  0,16  0,21 
1999  0,34  0,43  0,52  0,48  43,44  41,33  39,87  0,41  1,15  1,20  1,24  0,42  0,02  0,03  0,05  0,55  0,14  0,16  0,15  0,20 
2000  0,35  0,45  0,53  0,42  43,88  41,39  40,30  0,30  1,15  1,19  1,24  0,57  0,02  0,03  0,04  0,37  0,14  0,18  0,18  0,04 
2001  0,35  0,44  0,52  0,44  43,80  40,77  40,14  0,17  1,15  1,17  1,22  0,68  0,02  0,02  0,05  0,80  0,14  0,16  0,20  0,60 
2002  0,36  0,46  0,53  0,41  43,73  41,37  40,20  0,33  1,16  1,20  1,24  0,52  0,03  0,03  0,05  0,72  0,13  0,17  0,19  0,23 
2003  0,36  0,47  0,55  0,43  43,99  41,60  40,69  0,28  1,15  1,20  1,23  0,39  0,02  0,03  0,05  0,44  0,12  0,15  0,19  0,50 
2004  0,33  0,44  0,52  0,40  45,13  42,49  40,99  0,36  1,17  1,19  1,24  0,73  0,02  0,04  0,05  0,53  0,13  0,17  0,21  0,53 
2005  0,33  0,42  0,50  0,46  46,04  44,92  43,94  0,47  1,16  1,20  1,24  0,45  0,02  0,03  0,05  0,58  0,17  0,17  0,18  1,10 
2006  0,34  0,42  0,50  0,48  46,75  46,00  45,45  0,43  1,16  1,22  1,23  0,11  0,02  0,03  0,05  0,72  0,16  0,18  0,20  0,38 
2007  0,38  0,46  0,52  0,40  47,52  46,76  46,50  0,26  1,16  1,22  1,25  0,42  0,02  0,03  0,04  0,63  0,17  0,19  0,18  0,58 
2008  0,38  0,46  0,52  0,45  47,64  47,24  46,94  0,43  1,16  1,20  1,26  0,58  0,03  0,04  0,03  3,28  0,18  0,19  0,19  0,06 
  vocational education  primary education  #person <15  # person 16-65  # person 65+ 
year  Control  Matched 
Control  Treated  bias 
reduc  Control  Matched 
Control  Treated  bias 
reduc  Control  Matched 
Control  Treated  bias 
reduc  Control  Matched 
Control  Treated  bias 
reduc  Control  Matched 
Control  Treated  bias 
reduc 
1998  0,44  0,50  0,49  0,12  0,42  0,31  0,27  0,29  1,30  1,44  1,46  0,16  2,74  2,91  2,91  0,02  0,35  0,20  0,15  0,26 
1999  0,47  0,55  0,53  0,38  0,37  0,23  0,22  0,10  1,35  1,39  1,40  0,12  2,77  2,89  2,98  0,45  0,30  0,20  0,17  0,23 
2000  0,44  0,53  0,52  0,01  0,39  0,25  0,21  0,19  1,25  1,32  1,30  0,33  2,83  3,05  3,03  0,08  0,33  0,21  0,15  0,31 
2001  0,49  0,59  0,55  0,58  0,34  0,20  0,16  0,22  1,18  1,27  1,26  0,08  2,88  3,01  3,06  0,24  0,30  0,19  0,15  0,23 
2002  0,50  0,54  0,53  0,34  0,33  0,23  0,18  0,33  1,19  1,25  1,23  0,50  2,85  2,97  3,03  0,33  0,33  0,19  0,17  0,11 
2003  0,51  0,55  0,54  0,14  0,34  0,24  0,17  0,37  1,18  1,24  1,24  0,04  2,92  3,09  3,16  0,32  0,34  0,20  0,17  0,18 
2004  0,51  0,55  0,53  1,19  0,32  0,21  0,16  0,33  1,15  1,34  1,29  0,40  2,91  3,02  3,05  0,16  0,32  0,21  0,17  0,24 
2005  0,49  0,54  0,54  0,03  0,32  0,24  0,19  0,38  1,14  1,15  1,24  0,95  2,94  3,11  3,10  0,07  0,30  0,18  0,17  0,06 
2006  0,51  0,52  0,51  5,75  0,30  0,25  0,21  0,41  1,10  1,07  1,13  1,83  2,95  3,07  3,15  0,44  0,32  0,20  0,18  0,10 
2007  0,52  0,56  0,53  1,63  0,28  0,21  0,20  0,01  1,03  1,01  1,03  8,24  2,94  3,05  3,12  0,42  0,35  0,22  0,21  0,05 
2008  0,52  0,53  0,52  0,37  0,26  0,21  0,21  0,02  1,04  0,98  1,01  1,55  2,91  3,04  3,11  0,34  0,35  0,21  0,23  0,12 
Notes: In column Control the average value of variable in the control group is presented, column Matched Control reports the average value for matched control observation whereas column Treated reports the 
average values of variable in treated group. Column bias reduction shows a percentage of the total bias that is reduced due to matching – for values below one bias is reduced, while for values above one bias is 
extended.  